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A bond indenture is the contract controlling the relationship be-
tween investors in corporate bonds and the issuer of those bonds.
Large financial institutions, such as U.S. Bank, Bank of NY Mellon,
and Deutsche Bank, typically administer the governance of bond in-
dentures on behalf of the investors; in that role, they are called inden-
ture trustees or, more colloquially, bond trustees.
A. BONDHOLDERS AND SHAREHOLDERS
Bondholders, therefore, are the primary beneficiaries of indenture
governance, just as shareholders are the primary beneficiaries of cor-
porate governance.  As beneficiaries, though, bondholders and share-
holders have much different expectations.  Indenture governance and
corporate governance have evolved differently to meet those different
expectations.
For example, because bondholders are only entitled to—and thus,
only expect to receive—principal and accrued interest on their bonds,
indenture governance has evolved to protect that recovery.1  In con-
trast, because shareholders, as residual claimants of the firm, are en-
titled to (and thus expect to receive) the firm’s surplus value,
corporate governance has evolved to increase that value.2
Most people would consider corporate governance as much more
important than indenture governance.  In part, that is because corpo-
rations and stock markets are highly visible to the average person.
Also, a corporate manager’s job—to try to increase shareholder
value—involves more judgment and discretion, and thus can be more
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1. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unrav-
eling the Mystery, 58 BUS. L. 559, 561 (2003).
2. See id.
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interesting (and more desirable of scholarly study), than an indenture
trustee’s job of merely protecting bondholder recovery.
Still, indenture governance is critically important.  Domestically
and worldwide, the amounts invested in bonds dwarfs the amounts
invested in stock.  Recent data show, for example, that global bond
issuance is almost thirty times greater than global equity issuance.3
B. INDENTURE TRUSTEE DUTIES
Historically, an indenture trustee’s governance duties turn on
whether the trustee is acting pre-default or post-default.
1. Post-Default Duties
Once an indenture defaults—in the worst case, because the issuer
has failed to pay its bonds—the law requires the indenture trustee to
act on behalf of the bondholders as would a prudent person in similar
circumstances regarding its own affairs.4
Many post-default decisions—such as whether to accelerate the
maturity of the bonds or to liquidate collateral—involve difficult judg-
ment calls.5  These decisions are made more difficult by what I have
called a “protection gap”: when things go wrong, investors often blame
parties with deep pockets, especially indenture trustees, for failing to
protect them.6
Post-default indenture governance becomes even more compli-
cated when the bondholders themselves have conflicting interests
caused, for example, by conflicting payment priorities or conflicting
sources of payment.7  The indenture trustee then also faces the diffi-
cult task of trying to understand and balance the respective obliga-
tions owed to conflicting classes, sometimes called “tranches,” of
investors—which involves what some have called “tranche warfare.”
3. See, e.g., SIFMA, SIFMA FACT BOOK 45-46 (2018), https://www.sifma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/US-Fact-Book-2018-SIFMA.pdf (showing that, in 2017, global
long-term bond issuance was $21,099.7 billion versus global equity issuance of only
$720.7 billion).
4. See, e.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 315(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (2018) (“The
indenture trustee shall exercise in case of default . . . the same degree of care and skill
. . . as a prudent man would exercise or use under the circumstances in the conduct of
his own affairs.”).
5. See Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of
the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (2008) (“Indenture trustees for de-
faulted bonds . . . face the conundrum that they are required to act prudently but lack
clear guidance on what prudence means.”).
6. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Roberta Mitchell Lecture: Structuring Responsibility
in Securitization Transactions, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 804 (2012).
7. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1867 (2010).
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Notwithstanding its complexities, post-default indenture govern-
ance is informed by case law.  And perhaps because of its complexities,
post-default indenture governance is also informed by legal
scholarship.
2. Pre-Default Duties
In contrast, pre-default indenture governance is not yet well-in-
formed by either case law or legal scholarship.  The paucity of gui-
dance reflects that, absent a default, bond investors were relatively
passive.  The rising challenge of activist investors is now changing
that.  Thus, it is critical to understand what an indenture trustee’s
pre-default duties should be.
For example, activist investors—which include hedge funds and
so-called “vulture” funds—are buying bonds of troubled companies, at
deep discounts.  As bondholders, they then make demands on inden-
ture trustees.  They also sue indenture trustees for losses on their
bonds.
Indenture trustees must know how to respond.  My goal is to try
to provide a framework for guiding an indenture trustee’s response.
To start, let us consider the history of an indenture trustee’s pre-
default duties.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE TIA HISTORICAL RECORD
The history of enactment of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939
(“TIA”)8 provides a valuable record of the original debate over inden-
ture trustee’s pre-default responsibilities.  Congress enacted the TIA
in order to restore investor confidence in the bond markets following
the stock-market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.
The TIA currently requires the appointment of an indenture trus-
tee for bondholders in most public bond issuances over $10 million.9
The indenture trustee’s basic role, according to the TIA, is to help
solve the collective action problem that bondholders individually may
be unable to coordinate their actions with other bondholders.10
The 1929 report of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) that led to enactment of the TIA criticized the passive, or
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–77bbbb (2018).
9. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(9) (2018).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb(a)(1) (stating that the TIA was enacted because “individ-
ual action by [investors] . . . is rendered impracticable by reason of the disproportionate
expense,” “concerted action by [investors] in their common interest . . . is impeded by
reason of the wide dispersion of [investors] through many States,” and relevant infor-
mation may not be available to all investors).
672 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
“ministerial,” pre-default role generally taken at that time by inden-
ture trustees.11  The SEC recommended that a post-default “prudent
man” standard should apply to indenture trustee performance both
pre- and post-default,12 and that indenture trustees should be re-
quired to actively monitor actions of a bond issuer.13  Almost a decade
later when the TIA was enacted, however, the pre-default ministerial
role had become widely accepted in market practice and was codified
into the TIA.14
B. BOND MARKET CHANGES
The indenture trustee’s pre-default duties have not been seriously
re-examined since 1939, but the bond market has changed dramati-
cally.  Institutional investors now dominate, holding over 80% of cor-
porate and foreign bonds.15  There are few retail investors.
Institutional investors face less of a collective action problem than re-
tail investors.
Whether or not due to bond-market changes, there are conflicting
views today of the indenture trustee’s pre-default role.  The dominant
view by far reflects the ministerial role that was codified in the TIA:
that indenture trustees have no pre-default fiduciary duties to bond-
holders.  Rather, their indenture-governance duties are ministerial
and limited to the specific terms of the indenture.16  These duties typi-
cally include administrative tasks such as mailing notices or selecting
bonds for redemption or delivering certificates, preparing and trans-
mitting reports, and forwarding notices.
Since the 2007 to 2008 financial crisis (the “financial crisis”), how-
ever, some investors argue that indenture trustees—especially inden-
ture trustees of securitized bond issues—should have some pre-
default fiduciary duties.  Understanding this requires an understand-
ing of the categories of bond issues.
11. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK,
ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMIT-
TEES, PART VI—TRUSTEES UNDER INDENTURES 110 (1936).
12. Wilber G. Katz, Responsibility of Trustees Under the Federal Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, 26 A.B.A. J. 290, 291 (1940).
13. Stewart M. Robertson, Debenture Holders and the Indenture Trustee: Control-
ling Managerial Discretion in the Solvent Enterprise, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461,
472-73 (1988).
14. 15 U.S.C.§ 77ooo(a)(1).
15. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNT OF THE
UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC
ACCOUNTS: SECOND QUARTER 2015 122 (2015).
16. See, e.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a)(1) (2018); Elliott
Assocs. v. J. Henry Schroder Bank & Tr. Co., 838 F.2d 66, 68-71 (2d Cir. 1988).
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C. THE CATEGORIES OF BOND ISSUES
In unsecured bond issues, which dominate bond issuance, the in-
denture trustee acts for the benefit of investors whose right to pay-
ment is based on a contract claim against the issuer.  This is little
different from how an “agent bank” acts for a syndicate of unsecured
bank lenders.  In secured bond issues, the indenture trustee acts that
same way and, usually, also as a collateral agent for the investors.
In securitized bond issues,17 the indenture trustee acts for the
benefit of investors whose right to payment is limited to collections on
specified financial assets, such as mortgage loans.18
Even prior to the financial crisis, credit-rating agencies debated
whether indenture trustees of securitized bond issues have greater
duties than indenture trustees of other types of bond issues.19  During
the financial crisis, some practitioners also observed expectations that
indenture trustees of securitized bond issues may have higher pre-de-
fault duties than indenture trustees of other bond issues.20
Whether or not inspired by these precedents, I have seen several
complaints in recent lawsuits alleging that, pre-default, an indenture
trustee of a securitized bond issue should “police the deal” for, or oth-
erwise protect, the investors.21  To date, however, courts have not
17. The indenture in a securitized bond issue is often designated a pooling and
servicing agreement, or “PSA.”  In my experience, the relevant provisions concerning
the trustee of a securitized bond issue are identical whether it uses an indenture or a
PSA.  Also, some securitized bond issues, even though involving a public offering, have
been interpreted to be outside the scope of the TIA. See Ret. Bd. of Police v. Bank of
N.Y. Mellon, 775 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that certain pass-through mort-
gage-backed securities were exempt from the TIA under § 304(a)(2) because they were
“ ‘certificate[s] of interest or participation in two or more securities having substantially
different rights and privileges,’ namely, the numerous mortgage loans held by each
trust”).  My normative analysis of securitized bond issues is not dependent on whether
such bond issues are subject to the TIA.
18. Steven L. Schwarcz, What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1283, 1295-98 (2012).
19. Compare MOODY’S GLOBAL CREDIT RESEARCH, MOODY RE-EXAMINES TRUSTEE’S
ROLES IN ABS AND MBS 3-4 (2003) (suggesting that indenture trustees in MBS transac-
tions have an affirmative duty to investigate likely servicer defaults and to be proactive
participants) with Fitch: Seller/Servicer Risk Trumps Trustee’s Role In U.S. ABS
Transactions, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 24, 2003), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20030224005501/en/Fitch-SellerServicer-Risk-Trumps-Trustees-Role-U.S. (stating that
such “unrealistic reliance on [indenture] trustees” in MBS and other securitization
transactions not only “misses the mark” but also “increases the risk to investors by
potentially masking other more important considerations” such as the quality of ser-
vicer performance).
20. See, e.g., Christopher J. Brady, Marla Chernof Cohen, & Harold L. Kaplan, The
Role of the Trustee in Securitization Transactions, ch. 9, at 9-3, in SECURITIZATION OF
FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 3d ed. Supp. 2013).
21. See, e.g., Complaint at 2-3, Commerzbank AG v. Bank of New York Mellon, No.
1:15-cv-10029 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2015) (contending that prior to an Event of Default, a
trustee for a securitized bond issue is required to police the deal for investors).
674 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
ruled that indenture trustees have greater duties in securitized bond
issues.
III. ANALYZING PRE-DEFAULT DUTIES
To analyze what pre-default duties an indenture trustee should
have, consider the possible normative frameworks for legally imposing
duties in a business context.  There are two potentially overlapping
frameworks: to correct market failures and to maximize efficiency.
A. CORRECTING MARKET FAILURES
The fundamental normative justification for financial regulation
is to correct market failures.  The primary justification for regulating
the duties of a trustee pre-default, therefore, should be to correct pre-
default market failures.
When the TIA originally was enacted in 1939, many of the bond-
holders for whom indenture trustees acted were retail investors.
Without an indenture trustee acting for them, they were unable to
adequately protect themselves because of a collective action problem—
which is a type of market failure.  Today, institutional investors domi-
nate the bond markets, greatly reducing that collective action
problem.
But the rise of activist investors and the emergence of securitized
bond issues have created other market failures.  The rise of activist
investors has created a possible agency failure: activist investors do
not necessarily act for the benefit of the other investors.  The emer-
gence of securitized bond issues has created a possible information
failure: some securitized bond issues are so complex that investors do
not always fully understand them.22
I do not see why indenture trustees should, or even how they
could, correct the agency failure.  Activist investors are responsible for
that failure.  Future indentures should be drafted to try to limit the
ability of those investors to cause such failure.
Nonetheless, indenture trustees should not want to exacerbate
that failure.  When requested to take an action, for example, an inden-
ture trustee may wish to consider whether that action could create or
worsen a conflict of interest among investors.  If so, it should have the
right to refuse to take that action—provided that refusal violates
neither the indenture nor formal investor directions.
Nor do I see why indenture trustees should, or how they could,
correct the information failure.  Securitizations can be extremely com-
22. Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization and Post-Crisis Financial Regulation, 102
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 115, 131 (2016).
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plex.  It can take around forty pages to describe the underlying finan-
cial assets, and around thirty pages to describe how cash flows from
those assets are allocated.23  Large securitizations may be even more
complex, including multiple types of underlying financial assets and
multiple tranches of bonds.
There is no evidence, though, that indenture trustees could cor-
rect that information failure.  Indenture trustees receive relatively
tiny fees, and the trust departments of financial institutions normally
engage in only relatively ministerial tasks.24  Indenture trustees
rarely even negotiate the terms of the indentures.  Instead, they are
usually presented the transaction documents at the last minute and
asked to sign with little to no opportunity to make changes.25
In contrast, the institutional investors in securitized bond issues,
including the activist investors, are highly sophisticated.  In the Rule
144A-exempt transactions that characterize many securitized bond is-
sues, the investors must be qualified institutional buyers (“QIBs”): the
highest SEC ranking of investor sophistication and size.  Indenture
trustees could not understand complex securitized bond issues better
than those investors.26
B. MAXIMIZING EFFICIENCY
Another normative justification for financial regulation is maxi-
mizing efficiency.  In theory, correcting market failures should make
private markets work efficiently.
In practice, though, maximizing efficiency requires avoiding any
duplication of efforts.  The pre-default duties of indenture trustees are
usually limited to straightforward administrative tasks.  Indenture
trustees should not be performing additional pre-default roles that du-
plicate what other parties are doing.
Also, if future indentures require indenture trustees to perform
additional pre-default roles, they would then want to be further com-
pensated.  Payment of that compensation would reduce the value of
the trust estate for bondholders.
23. Andra C. Ghent et. al., Complexity in Structured Finance 14 (Nov. 2, 2017)
(unpublished draft), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2325835.
24. AM. BANKERS ASS’N, CORPORATE TRUST COMMITTEE, THE TRUSTEE’S ROLE IN AS-
SET-BACKED SECURITIES 3 (2010).
25. Id. at 4.
26. Cf. Press Release, Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by Counselor to the Secre-
tary for Housing Finance Policy Dr. Michael Stegman Before the Structured Finance
Industry Group 1st Annual Private Label Symposium (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.trea-
sury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2694.aspx (concluding that the “core com-
petency of [indenture] trustees is in carrying out administrative functions, not in
forensic activities that require subjectivity and judgment, which is ultimately what a
fiduciary must exercise”).
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The current equilibrium of small trustee fees and (except when
the trustee is formally directed by investors, as I will later discuss)
ministerial pre-default duties represents the current market practice
for balancing costs and benefits.  Market practice provides a presump-
tion of efficiency.
C. ARTICULATING A NORMATIVE RULE
This analysis suggests the following rule.  Pre-default, an inden-
ture trustee should only have the duties specified in the indenture.
An indenture trustee also should have the right to refuse to take an
action that could create or exacerbate a conflict of interest among in-
vestors, provided that refusal violates neither the indenture nor for-
mal investor directions.
This rule could result in a pre-default protection gap if the inden-
ture fails to assign any specific party to enforce pre-default remedies.
For example, some securitization indentures fail to assign a party to
enforce certain remedies for breaches of representations and warran-
ties regarding purchased financial assets.
If such a protection gap arises, the bondholders typically could
protect themselves, such as by marshalling the requisite voting rights
(and providing adequate indemnification of costs) to contractually di-
rect the indenture trustee or the servicer to enforce those remedies.
Sometimes, bondholders might be unable to marshal the requisite vot-
ing rights to protect themselves; but courts have refused to infer im-
plied covenants to protect sophisticated bondholders.27
IV. APPLYING THE PROPOSED PRE-DEFAULT NORMATIVE
RULE
Next, let us apply the rule for determining an indenture trustee’s
pre-default duties to the types of issues that may arise in lawsuits.
A. TAKING ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER REMEDIAL ACTIONS
Even prior to a formal default, one or more investors may demand
that the indenture trustee take some enforcement or other remedial
action to try to correct a perceived problem.  Compliance with that de-
mand could be expensive; indenture trustees normally are entitled to
reimbursement of their enforcement costs from the trust estate, which
would reduce the value of that estate for investors generally.  Taking
27. Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (refusing to find an implied covenant protecting investors where the bond inden-
ture lacked that protection).
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remedial action could, therefore, create a conflict if it would dispropor-
tionately benefit only certain investors.
For example, activist investors may purchase “underwater” sub-
ordinated (junior) bonds at pennies on the dollar.  Those investors
may then demand that the indenture trustee take an expensive en-
forcement action, with relatively little chance of success—but a high
recovery if successful.
If the issuer is solvent enough to pay the senior bonds, then tak-
ing that enforcement action would be unlikely to benefit the senior
investors.  It could hurt them, though, if the cost of a failed enforce-
ment action reduces the issuer’s ability to pay the senior bonds.
The activist investors, nonetheless, would want the indenture
trustee to take that enforcement action.  Absent that action, their sub-
ordinated bonds are worth little—so they would lose little if the action
is unsuccessful.  But taking the action gives them a small chance of
being paid in full.
Absent formal investor directions, an indenture trustee should
have the right to refuse to take that action.  In case of doubt, an inden-
ture trustee could seek—or could request the investors demanding the
action to arrange for—formal investor directions.  An indenture typi-
cally allows investors with at least 25-50% of voting rights to direct
the indenture trustee to act, and to indemnify the indenture trustee
for the cost of taking the action.28
B. INVESTIGATING “RED FLAGS” AND OTHER SUSPICIOUS
OCCURRENCES
Investors may become aware of so-called red flags or other suspi-
cious occurrences in a bond issue (such as an unusual number of mort-
gage-loan defaults), even prior to a formal default.  One or more
investors may then demand that the indenture trustee investigate the
event.  Compliance with that demand could be costly, reducing the
value of the estate for investors generally.
The indenture trustee’s engagement in such an investigation
could, therefore, create a conflict if it would disproportionately benefit
only certain investors.  For example, an investor in subordinated
bonds who might benefit from an expensive investigation would have
an incentive to direct the indenture trustee to make that investigation
28. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and
the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title, 63 DUKE L. J. 637, 709 (2013) (observing that a typi-
cal indenture allows holders of more than 25% principal amount of bonds to control
trustee actions).  The TIA requires indentures to authorize at least majority bondhold-
ers to direct the trustee’s exercise of power.  Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77ppp(a)(1) (2018).
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if the costs of an unsuccessful investigation are disproportionately
borne by investors in more senior bonds.  Absent formal investor direc-
tions, an indenture trustee should have the right to refuse to make
that investigation.
Even absent an investor demand, investors sometimes use the in-
denture trustee’s failure to investigate a red flag or other suspicious
occurrence as a basis for a later claim against the indenture trustee as
a deep pocket.  Although indentures typically absolve trustees from
liability unless they act negligently or with willful misconduct, inves-
tors sometimes argue that a trustee’s failure to make the investigation
constitutes negligence.  Reading an indenture as a consistent whole,
however, the more specific governing text would appear to be the stan-
dard provision that the trustee “undertakes to perform . . . only such
duties as are specifically set forth” in the indenture and has no duty to
investigate any “facts or matters” unless appropriately requested by
investors to do so.  An omission cannot be negligent if there is no duty
to act.
C. MONITORING AND SUPERVISING SERVICERS (AND OTHER PARTIES)
In securitized bond issues, the bondholders are dependent on col-
lections on the purchased financial assets.  Invariably, therefore,
these transactions require a party, usually called a servicer (or some-
times, collection agent), to service those financial assets and collect
payment thereon.29  In litigation filed following the financial crisis,
which caused widespread defaults on residential mortgage loans,
some investors argued that indenture trustees in mortgage-backed se-
curities transactions should have monitored or supervised the per-
formance of the mortgage-loan servicer.30
An indenture could specifically require the indenture trustee to
supervise the servicer or assure that the servicer complies with the
indenture.  However, more typically in my experience, indentures pro-
vide that the indenture trustee has no duty to monitor or supervise
the servicer.  Instead, the servicer itself typically attests periodically
to its own compliance, and the indenture trustee is entitled to rely on
the truth and accuracy of that attestation.31
29. The servicer normally is required to act in the “best interests” of the investors.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 392 (2008).
30. See, e.g., Ellington Credit Fund, Ltd. v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 837 F.
Supp. 2d 162, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (alleging that trustee of securitization breached its
duty for insufficient supervision of servicer).
31. Sometimes an experienced master servicer may be appointed to supervise the
servicer’s performance.
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Absent clear indenture language, should the indenture trustee
have a pre-default duty to monitor or supervise the servicer?  I think
not.  Imposing a monitoring or servicing requirement would be dupli-
cative and expensive—and thus inefficient.  Furthermore, most inden-
ture trustees are not equipped or compensated to monitor or supervise
the servicer’s performance, which typically involves collecting pay-
ments on the financial assets, communicating with borrowers, ad-
dressing borrower delinquencies and bankruptcies, working out loan
modifications or other borrower difficulties, foreclosing on properties,
maintaining foreclosed homes, and selling real-estate-owned proper-
ties after foreclosure.
D. MONITORING FOR FORMAL DEFAULTS
Investors sometimes claim that an indenture trustee should have
a pre-default duty to monitor for the existence of a formal default,
sometimes termed an “Event of Default.”  Such a default could trigger
the post-default heightened “prudent person” duty.  Some practition-
ers have likewise suggested that indenture trustees for securitized
bond issues might have this pre-default monitoring duty.32  Inden-
tures normally provide, however, that notwithstanding the actual ex-
istence of a formal default, the indenture trustee’s post-default
heightened duty is not triggered until a responsible officer of the in-
denture trustee has “actual knowledge” or, if the indenture provides,
written notice of that formal default.
Consistent with that indenture language, I do not believe that an
indenture trustee should have a pre-default monitoring duty.  Requir-
ing such a duty would require the indenture trustee to constantly in-
vestigate all events that might trigger the default.  That would be
expensive and time consuming—and thus, inefficient—with investors
bearing the cost.
Requiring such a duty also could expose the indenture trustee to
indeterminate liability if it failed, even for reasons beyond its control,
to become aware of a default.  Uncertainty of the standard by which
their performance would be judged would discourage financial institu-
tions from acting as indenture trustees, or at least motivate them to
charge higher fees to compensate for the risk.
Investors sometimes may notify the indenture trustee that a de-
fault has occurred, without clearly showing the existence of the de-
fault.  What should be the duty of an indenture trustee regarding an
32. Brady et al., supra note 20, at 9-7 (discussing the additional sophistication and
specialization needed for such a trustee “to achieve an appropriate awareness of possi-
ble weakening financial condition of an issuer or servicer or to determine early amorti-
zation events”).
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alleged, but unproved (or possibly disputed), default—such as an alle-
gation based solely on news media, that the servicer is acting
improperly?
The answer should take into account and attempt to balance com-
mon-sense, practical considerations.  That could include the indenture
trustee having conversations with the servicer about its performance,
communicating the results of those conversations to the investors, and
seeking, or requesting the investors to obtain, formal investor
directions.
V. RESOLVING AMBIGUITIES
Any normative rules for determining an indenture trustee’s pre-
default duties inevitably will face ambiguities.  Consider how an in-
denture trustee could try to resolve ambiguities.
A. OBTAIN LEGAL OPINION
An indenture trustee could try to obtain a legal opinion to resolve
ambiguities.  Section 8.01 of most indentures, entitled “Duties and Re-
sponsibility of the Trustee,” usually allows indenture trustees acting
in good faith to “conclusively rely” on opinions that conform to the in-
denture’s requirements.33
Furthermore, § 8.02 of most indentures, entitled “Certain Rights
of the Trustee,” usually allows indenture trustees to consult with
counsel and to rely on “the written advice” or “an opinion” of counsel
as “full and complete authorization and protection for any action
taken, suffered or omitted by it in good faith and in accordance with
such advice or opinion.”34
B. OBTAIN INVESTOR DIRECTIONS
An indenture trustee also could attempt to resolve ambiguities by
trying to obtain formal investor directions, as mentioned.35  If the in-
denture trustee receives those directions, it should be justified in fol-
lowing them.
C. SEEK JUDICIAL GUIDANCE
In more difficult or sensitive cases, an indenture trustee could
seek judicial guidance.  Two basic types of judicial procedures—inter-
pleader and declaratory judgment actions—may be appropriate.
33. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, MODEL FORM OF TRUST INDENTURE
§ 8.01(a)(2).
34. Id. § 8.02(d).
35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Interpleader is a procedure whereby a party with property subject
to competing claims may compel the parties asserting those claims to
litigate their dispute in a single proceeding.36
An indenture trustee also might request a declaratory judgment
to have a court determine its rights prior to taking action that may
expose it to liability.  Unlike interpleader, however, a declaratory
judgment action requires the existence of an “actual controversy.”37
D. EXERCISE COMMON SENSE
Lacking other guidance, an indenture trustee ultimately should
rely on common sense.  For example, regardless of what the indenture
trustee’s duty otherwise should be, the occurrence of a suspicious
event should not trigger a duty to investigate occurrences and events
that are unrelated to that event.  Such an extraneous investigation
could significantly reduce trust assets without commensurately bene-
fitting the investors.
Similarly, absent formal investor directions, an indenture trustee
should not generally take an action that would be expensive but un-
likely to lead to a net favorable outcome—such as investigating
whether a bankrupt or clearly insolvent party had breached one or
more of its representations and warranties.  Even if the indenture
trustee could prove such a breach, a damage claim against that party
may be unrecoverable.
36. CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 22:1 (3d ed. 2005).
37. Robert J. Coughlin et al., Rule 22 to Resolve a Catch-22: Defensive Maneuvers
for Corporate Trustees Faced with Conflicting Claims, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
SECURITIZATION 2008 777, 783 (2008).
